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Abstract
User contributions in the form of posts, comments, and votes
are essential to the success of online communities. However,
allowing user participation also invites undesirable behavior
such as trolling. In this paper, we characterize antisocial be-
havior in three large online discussion communities by ana-
lyzing users who were banned from these communities. We
find that such users tend to concentrate their efforts in a small
number of threads, are more likely to post irrelevantly, and
are more successful at garnering responses from other users.
Studying the evolution of these users from the moment they
join a community up to when they get banned, we find that
not only do they write worse than other users over time, but
they also become increasingly less tolerated by the commu-
nity. Further, we discover that antisocial behavior is exacer-
bated when community feedback is overly harsh. Our analy-
sis also reveals distinct groups of users with different levels of
antisocial behavior that can change over time. We use these
insights to identify antisocial users early on, a task of high
practical importance to community maintainers.
Introduction
User-generated content is critical to the success of any on-
line platforms. On news websites such as CNN, users com-
ment on articles and rate the comments of other users; on so-
cial networks such as Facebook, users contribute posts that
others can then comment and vote on; on Q&A communi-
ties such as StackOverflow, users contribute and rate ques-
tions and answers. These sites engage their users by allowing
them to contribute and discuss content, strengthening their
sense of ownership and loyalty (Binns 2012).
While most users tend to be civil, others may engage
in antisocial behavior, negatively affecting other users and
harming the community. Such undesired behavior, which in-
cludes trolling, flaming, bullying, and harassment, is exacer-
bated by the fact that people tend to be less inhibited in their
online interactions (Suler 2004).
Many platforms implement mechanisms designed to dis-
courage antisocial behavior. These include community mod-
eration, up- and down-voting, the ability to report posts,
mute functionality, and more drastically, completely block-
ing users’ ability to post. Additionally, algorithmic rank-
ing attempts to hide undesirable content (Hsu, Khabiri, and
Caverlee 2009). Still, antisocial behavior is a significant
problem that can result in offline harassment and threats of
violence (Wiener 1998).
Despite its severity and prevalence, surprisingly little is
known about online antisocial behavior. While some work
has tried to experimentally establish causal links, for exam-
ple, between personality type and trolling (Buckels, Trap-
nell, and Paulhus 2014), most research reports qualitative
studies that focus on characterizing antisocial behavior (Do-
nath 1999; Hardaker 2010), often by studying the behavior
of a small number of users in specific communities (Her-
ring et al. 2011; Shachaf and Hara 2010). A more complete
understanding of antisocial behavior requires a quantitative,
large-scale, longitudinal analysis of this phenomenon. This
can lead to new methods for identifying undesirable users
and minimizing troll-like behavior, which can ultimately re-
sult in healthier online communities.
The present work. In this paper, we characterize forms of
antisocial behavior in large online discussion communities.
We use retrospective longitudinal analyses to quantify such
behavior throughout an individual user’s tenure in a commu-
nity. This enables us to address several questions about an-
tisocial behavior: First, are there users that only become an-
tisocial later in their community life, or is deviant behavior
innate? Second, does a community’s reaction to users’ anti-
social behavior help them improve, or does it instead cause
them to become more antisocial? Last, can antisocial users
be effectively identified early on?
To answer these questions, we examine three large online
discussion-based communities: CNN.com, a general news
site, Breitbart.com, a political news site, and IGN.com, a
computer gaming site. On these sites, editors and journalists
post articles on which users can then comment. We study
complete data from these websites: over 18 months, 1.7 mil-
lion users contributed nearly 40 million posts and more than
100 million votes. In these communities, members that re-
peatedly violate community norms are eventually banned
permanently. Such individuals are clear instances of antiso-
cial users, and constitute “ground truth” in our analyses.
Characterizing antisocial behavior. We compare the ac-
tivity of users who are later banned from a community, or
Future-Banned Users (FBUs), with that of users who were
never banned, or Never-Banned Users (NBUs). By analyzing
the language of their posts, we find significant differences
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between these two groups. For example, FBUs tend to write
less similarly to other users, and their posts are harder to un-
derstand according to standard readability metrics. They are
also more likely to use language that may stir further conflict
(e.g., they use less positive words and use more profanity).
FBUs also differ in how they engage in discussions: their
posts tend to be concentrated in individual threads rather
than spread out across several. They receive more replies
than average users, suggesting that they might be successful
in luring others into fruitless, time-consuming discussions.
Longitudinal analysis. We find that the behavior of an FBU
worsens over their active tenure in a community. Through
a combination of crowdsourcing experiments and machine
learning, we show that not only do they enter a community
writing worse posts than NBUs, but the quality of their posts
also worsens more over time. This suggests that communi-
ties may play a part in incubating antisocial behavior. In fact,
users who are excessively censored early in their lives are
more likely to exhibit antisocial behavior later on. Further-
more, while communities appear initially forgiving (and are
relatively slow to ban these antisocial users), they become
less tolerant of such users the longer they remain in a com-
munity. This results in an increased rate at which their posts
are deleted, even after controlling for post quality.
Typology of antisocial users. Among FBUs, we observe
that the distribution of users’ post deletion rates (i.e., the
proportion of a user’s posts that get deleted by moderators)
is bimodal. Some FBUs have high post deletion rates, while
others have relatively low deletion rates. While both types
of FBUs tend to write similarly overall, those with high
post deletion rates write less similarly to other users in the
same discussion thread and write more in each discussion
they participate in, while those with low post deletion rates
spread their posts across a larger number of discussions, and
thus attract less attention. Starting from this observation, we
introduce a typology of antisocial behavior based on com-
paring a user’s post deletion rate across the first and second
halves of their life, and identify users who are getting worse
over time, as well as those who later redeem themselves.
Predicting future banning. Last, we show that a user’s
posting behavior can be used to make predictions about who
will be banned in the future. Inspired by our empirical anal-
ysis, we design features that capture various aspects of an-
tisocial behavior: post content, user activity, community re-
sponse, and the actions of community moderators. We find
that we can predict with over 80% AUC (area under the ROC
curve) whether a user will be subsequently banned. In fact,
we only need to observe 5 to 10 user’s posts before a clas-
sifier is able to make a reliable prediction. Further, cross-
domain classification performance remains high, suggesting
that the features indicative of antisocial behavior that we dis-
cover are not community-specific.
Antisocial behavior is an increasingly severe problem that
currently requires large amounts of manual labor to tame.
Our methods can effectively identify antisocial users early
in their community lives and alleviate some of this burden.
Related Work
We start by considering definitions of antisocial behavior,
summarize work on antisocial behavior online, then discuss
how such behavior can be detected in a variety of settings.
Antisocial behavior. Antisocial behavior, which includes
trolling, flaming, and griefing, has been widely discussed
in past literature. For instance, a troll has been defined as
a person that engages in “negatively marked online behav-
ior” (Hardaker 2010), or a user who initially pretends to be
a legitimate participant but later attempts to disrupt the com-
munity (Donath 1999). Trolls have also been characterized
as “creatures who take pleasure in upsetting others” (Kir-
man, Lineham, and Lawson 2012), and indeed, recent work
has found that sadism is strongly associated with trolling
tendencies (Buckels, Trapnell, and Paulhus 2014). Finally,
some literature instead provides a taxonomy of deviant be-
havior (Suler and Phillips 1998). In this paper, we rely on a
community and its moderators to decide who they consider
to be disruptive and harmful, and conduct aggregate analyses
of users who were permanently banned from a community.
Studying antisocial behavior. Research around antisocial
behavior has tended to be largely qualitative, generally in-
volving deep case study analyses of a small number of
manually-identified trolls. These analyses include the differ-
ent types of trolling that occur (Hardaker 2010), the motiva-
tions behind doing so (Shachaf and Hara 2010), and the dif-
ferent strategies that others use in response to trolls (Baker
2001; Chesney et al. 2009). Other work has quantified the
extent of such negative behavior online (Juvonen and Gross
2008). In contrast, the present work presents a large-scale
data-driven analysis of antisocial behavior in three large
online communities, with the goal of obtaining quantita-
tive insights and developing tools for the early detection of
trolls. Conceptually related is a prior study of the effects
of community feedback on user behavior (Cheng, Danescu-
Niculescu-Mizil, and Leskovec 2014), which revealed that
negative feedback can lead to antisocial behavior. However,
rather than focusing on individual posts, this paper takes a
longer-term approach and studies antisocial users and their
evolution throughout their community life.
Detecting antisocial behavior. Several papers have focused
on detecting vandalism on Wikipedia by using features such
as user language and reputation, as well as article meta-
data (Adler et al. 2011; Potthast, Stein, and Gerling 2008).
Other work has identified undesirable comments based their
relevance to the discussed article and the presence of in-
sults (Sood, Churchill, and Antin 2012), and predicted
whether players in an online game would be subsequently
punished for reported instances of bad behavior (Blackburn
and Kwak 2014). Rather than predicting whether a particu-
lar edit or comment is malicious, or focusing only on cases
of bad behavior, we instead predict whether individual users
will be subsequently banned from a community based on
their overall activity, and show how our models generalize
across multiple communities. Nonetheless, the text and post-
based features used in this prediction task are partially in-
spired by those used in prior work.
Community # Users # Users Banned # Threads # Posts # Posts Deleted # Posts Reported
CNN 1,158,947 37,627 (3.3%) 200,576 26,552,104 5,355,344 (21.4%) 1,156,005 (4.6%)
IGN 343,926 5,706 (1.7%) 682,870 7,967,414 184,643 (2.3%) 88,621 (1.1%)
Breitbart 246,422 5,350 (2.2%) 376,526 4,376,369 119,265 (2.7%) 117,779 (2.7%)
Table 1: Summary statistics of the three large news discussion communities analyzed. Percentages of totals are in parentheses.
Data Preparation
Dataset description. We investigated three online news
communities: CNN.com (general news), Breitbart.com (po-
litical news), and IGN.com (computer gaming), selected
based on their large size (Table 1). On these sites, commu-
nity members post comments on (news) articles, and each
comment can either be replied to, or voted on. In this paper,
we refer to comments and replies as posts, and to the list
of posts on the same article as a thread. Disqus, a comment-
ing platform that hosts the discussions in these communities,
provided us with a complete timestamped trace of user ac-
tivity from March 2012 to August 2013, as well as a list of
users that were banned from posting in these communities.
Measuring undesired behavior. On a discussion forum, un-
desirable behavior may be signaled in several ways: users
may down-vote, comment on, or report a post, and commu-
nity moderators may delete the offending post or outright
ban a user from ever posting again in the forum. However,
down-voting may signal disagreement rather than undesir-
ability. Also, many web sites such as Breitbart have low
down-voting rates (only 4% of all votes are down-votes);
others may simply not allow for down-voting. Further, one
would need to define arbitrary thresholds (e.g., a certain
fraction of down-votes) needed to label a user as antiso-
cial. Automatically identifying undesirable posts based on
the content of replies may also be unreliable. In contrast,
we find that post deletions are a highly precise indicator
of undesirable behavior, as only community moderators can
delete posts. Moderators generally act in accordance with a
community’s comment policy, which typically covers disre-
spectfulness, discrimination, insults, profanity, or spam. Post
reports are correlated with deletions, as these reported posts
are likely to be subsequently deleted.
At the user-level, bans are similarly strong indicators
of antisocial behavior, as only community moderators can
ban users. Empirically, we find that many of these banned
users exhibit such behavior. Apart from insults and profan-
ity, these include repeated attempts to bait users (“Ouch, ya
got me. What’s Google?”), provoke arguments (“Liberalism
truly breeds violence...this is evidence of that FACT”), or de-
rail discussions (“All I want to know is...was there a broom
involved in any shape or form?”).
Thus, we focus on users who moderators have subse-
quently banned from a community and refer to them as
Future-Banned Users or FBUs. While such an approach
does not necessarily identify every antisocial user, this re-
sults in a more precise set of users who were explicitly
labeled as undesirable. Further, we restrict our analysis to
banned users with at least five posts who joined a given com-
munity after March 2012, so that we can track their behav-
ior from the beginning of their community life to the time
they are banned. We excluded users who were banned mul-
tiple times so as not to confound the effects of temporary
bans with behavior change, as well as users whose posts
contained URLs to remove link spammers. After filtering,
we obtained a core set of banned users for each community
(N=10,476 for CNN, 660 for IGN, and 736 for Breitbart)
for which we had a complete trace of activity.
Matching FBUs and NBUs. First, we note that FBUs tend
to post more frequently than average users (prior to getting
banned): on CNN, a typical FBU makes 264 posts, but an av-
erage user makes only 22 posts. To control for this large dis-
parity in posting activity, we use matching (Rosenbaum and
Rubin 1983), a statistical technique used to support causal-
ity claims in observational studies, to control for the number
of posts a user made and the number of posts made per day.
In other words, for each FBU, or user who was later banned,
we identify a similarly active user that was never banned (a
Never-Banned User or NBU).
Measuring text quality. How might we obtain an un-
biased measure of the quality or appropriateness of a
post? Dictionary-based approaches may miss non-dictionary
words (e.g., “Obummer”); a classifier trained on the text of
deleted posts may confound post content and community
bias, as communities tend to develop animosity towards un-
desirable users over time and over-penalize them (Cheng,
Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil, and Leskovec 2014). Thus, we
instead obtained human judgments of the appropriateness of
a post, and collected labels for a random sample of 6000
posts using Mechanical Turk. To construct this dataset, 500
FBUs and NBUs were sampled from each of the three com-
munities, and two posts sampled from each user. Using the
text of a post alone, workers were asked, on a scale of 1 to 5,
to evaluate how appropriate a post was given general moder-
ation guidelines (i.e., to look out for disrespectfulness, dis-
crimination, insults, profanity, or spam). Each post was la-
beled by three independent workers, and their ratings aver-
aged (Krippendorff’s α=0.39). 131 workers completed these
tasks, and they rated deleted posts significantly lower than
non-deleted posts (2.4 vs. 3.0, p<10-4).
Using these labeled posts, we then trained a logistic re-
gression model on text bigrams to predict the text quality
(or appropriateness) of a post. Posts with a rating higher
than 3 were labeled as appropriate, and those a rating of 3
or lower were labeled as inappropriate. Under ten-fold cross
validation, the AUC attained by this classifier was 0.70. This
suggests that while the classifier is able to partially capture
this human decision making process and allow us to observe
overall trends in the data, other factors may play a significant
role in determining whether a post is appropriate.
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Figure 1: Users who get banned in the future (FBUs) (a) write less similarly to other users in the same thread, (b) write posts
that are harder to read (i.e., have a higher readability index), and (c) express less positive emotion.
Finally, the results reported in this paper apply to all three
communities studied unless otherwise noted. All figures are
plotted using data from the CNN community, and the figures
for other communities are qualitatively similar. Error bars
represent the standard error of the mean.
Understanding Antisocial Behavior
To understand antisocial behavior in the context of a dis-
cussion community, we first characterize how users who are
subsequently banned differ from those who are not in terms
of how they write, as well as how they act in a community.
Then, we analyze changes in behavior over the lifetimes of
these users to understand the effects of post quality, commu-
nity bias, and excessive censorship.
Characterizing Antisocial Behavior
Corroborating previous literature, we find significant differ-
ences in how FBUs and NBUs write, even after controlling
for similar posting activity (e.g., the number of posts made).
How do FBUs write? The similarity of a post to previous
posts in a same thread may reveal how users are contributing
to a community. Users can stay on-topic or veer off-topic;
prior work has also shown that users tend to adopt linguistic
conventions or jargon in a community (Danescu-Niculescu-
Mizil et al. 2013) and that they also unconsciously mimic
the choices of function-word classes they are communicat-
ing with (Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil, Gamon, and Dumais
2011). Here, we compare the average text similarity of a
user’s post with the previous three posts in the same thread
(if they exist), obtained by computing the cosine similar-
ity of words used in these posts. We find that the aver-
age text similarity of posts written by FBUs is significantly
lower than that of NBUs (t(20950)=16, p<10-4, Cohen’s
d=0.25 for CNN, t(1318)=4.2, p<10-4, d=0.30 for IGN, and
t(1470)=3.1, p<0.01, d=0.20 for Breitbart) (Figure 1a), sug-
gesting that FBUs make less of an effort to integrate or stay
on-topic. Overall, we find that post deletion is weakly neg-
atively correlated with text similarity (r=-0.08), which sug-
gests that off-topic posts are more likely to be deleted.
Next, we measure each post with respect to several read-
ability tests, including the Automated Readability Index
(ARI), which are designed to gauge how understandable a
piece of text is. While posts written by FBUs and NBUs have
similar word counts, those written by FBUs have a higher
ARI, and thus appear to be less readable than those written
by NBUs (t>2.36, p<0.01, d>0.05) (Figure 1b).
Prior research also suggests that trolls tend to make in-
flammatory posts (Hardaker 2010), and these observations
hold true here for FBUs and NBUs, though these effects are
relatively small. We compare the proportion of words used in
different LIWC categories (Pennebaker, Francis, and Booth
2001) to identify the different aspects in which the language
used by FBUs and NBUs differ (but nonetheless note that
this approach may miss non-dictionary words). While there
was no consistent trend with respect to the use of words
connotating negative emotion, we find that FBUs are less
likely to use positive words (t>4.58, p<10-4, d>0.06) (Fig-
ure 1c), corroborating research that suggests positive replies
to comments minimize conflict (Laniado et al. 2012). FBUs
are also more likely to swear (t>2.70, p<0.01, d>0.05), or
use less tentative or conciliatory language (i.e., less use of
words such as “could”, “perhaps”, or “consider”) (t>2.50,
p<0.05, d>0.08).
How do FBUs generate activity around themselves? Do
FBUs purposefully try to create discussions, or opportunis-
tically respond to an on-going discussion? Here, we find that
their behavior differs depending on the community (Figure
2a). On Breitbart and IGN, trolls are more likely to reply to
others’ posts, but on CNN, they are more likely to start new
discussions (t>9.1, p<10-4, d>0.25). Still, across all commu-
nities, FBUs appear to be effective at luring other users into
potentially fruitless discussions, supporting claims in previ-
ous literature about troll-like behavior (Herring et al. 2011):
the average number of replies a FBU gets is significantly
higher than that of a regular user (t>2.6, p<0.01, d>0.16,
Figure 2b). We observe a similar trend if we instead con-
sider all descendant posts instead of only direct replies (to
quantify the total discussion volume generated by a post).
Last, FBUs contribute significantly more posts per thread
they participate in (t>3.1, p<0.01, d>0.16, Figure 2c), per-
haps engaged in protracted discussions with other users.
Evolution Over Time
While FBUs behave differently from NBUs, how does their
behavior and the community’s perception of them change
over time? Here, we plot the post deletion rates (or pro-
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Figure 2: While FBUs may either (a) create or contribute to (already existing) discussions depending on the communty, they
generally (b) get more replies from other users, and (c) concentrate on fewer threads.
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Figure 3: (a) The rate of post deletion increases over time
for FBUs, but is effectively constant for NBUs. (b) Similarly,
text quality decreases over time for FBUs, but not for NBUs.
portion of posts deleted) of both types of users over time,
and where each user made at least 10 posts (before being
banned) (N=9379 for CNN, 582 for IGN, 569 for Breitbart).
On CNN, these FBUs survived an average of 42 days before
being banned; on IGN, they survived 103 days; on Breitbart,
82 days. Time, as defined by the index of a post, was nor-
malized across users. Figure 3a shows that on average, the
deletion rate of an FBU’s posts tends to increase over their
life in a community. In contrast, the deletion rate for NBUs
remains relatively constant.
The increase in the post deletion rate could have two
causes: (H1) a decrease in posting quality — that FBUs tend
to write worse later in their life; or, (H2) an increase in com-
munity bias — that the community starts to recognize these
users over time and becomes less tolerant of their behavior,
thus penalizing them more heavily.
To create a measure of post quality, we predict the text
quality of a post using a classifier trained on human labels
obtained via crowdsourcing, as described previously. Figure
3b shows that for FBUs (and maybe NBUs), text quality is
decreasing over time, suggesting that H1 may be supported.
To test both H1 and H2, we conducted a series of studies:
Do users write worse over time? While the text qual-
ity of posts by FBUs seems to be decreasing over time, is
this effect significant? To test the hypothesis that FBUs (or
NBUs) tend to write worse over time, we conducted an ex-
periment to see if people could differentiate posts written at
the beginning or the end of a user’s life (i.e., from the time
Mean Post Appropriateness on CNN (1-5)
All Posts First 10% Last 10%
FBUs 2.7 3.0 2.3
NBUs 3.3 3.5 3.2
Table 2: FBUs start out writing worse than NBUs and
worsen more than NBUs over the course of their life. Higher
appropriateness ratings correspond to higher quality posts.
they join the community to when they get banned). From
each community, we selected 200 FBUs and 200 NBUs at
random, and from each user sampled a random post from
the first 10% or last 10% of their entire posting history.
We then shuffled and presented each post to three differ-
ent workers on Mechanical Turk, and asked them to rate
the appropriateness of each post on a scale of 1 to 5, subse-
quently averaging these ratings. 95 workers completed these
tasks (Krippendorff’s α=0.35). As Table 2 shows, FBUs
enter a community already writing worse than NBUs (3.0
vs. 3.5 for CNN, p<0.05 for all communities). Moreover,
for both user types, post ratings also decreased with time
(p<0.05), supporting H1 and previous work that showed
that users in discussion communities tend to write worse
over time (Cheng, Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil, and Leskovec
2014). In fact, post ratings decreased more for FBUs than
NBUs (p<0.05, d<0.19 for NBUs, d>0.29 for FBUs). In
other words, while both FBUs and NBUs write worse over
time, this change in quality is larger for FBUs.
Instead comparing the predicted text quality of posts writ-
ten in the first half of a user’s life with that written in the
second half reveals similar findings (p<0.01), with larger ef-
fect sizes for FBUs (d>0.15) than NBUs (d<0.02). As most
FBUs only survive a month or two before getting banned,
larger changes may be observable over longer time periods.
Does community tolerance change over time? To test
for an effect of community tolerance or bias, we used
propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) to
pair random posts of similar predicted text quality. In each
pair, one post was taken from the first 10% of a user’s life,
and the other taken from the final 10% of a user’s life. After
obtaining these pairs, we performed a Wilcoxon Signed-rank
test to check whether a post taken from the start of a user’s
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Figure 4: (a) The distribution of FBUs’ proportions of deleted posts is bimodal, suggesting that there are two types of FBUs.
(b) These two groups exhibit different deletion rates over their lives, with Hi-FBUs appearing to write worse than Lo-FBUs.
(c) The change in deletion rates can be explained by a decrease in text similarity over time.
life is more likely than a post taken from the end of a user’s
life to be deleted.
Among FBUs, we find a significant effect of post time in
all communities (W>14705, p<10-4, effect size r>0.21), or
that a post was made in the last 10% of an FBU’s life is more
likely to be deleted, supporting H2. Among NBUs, there is
no significant effect (p>0.39, r<0.04). In other words, we
find a community bias against FBUs: posts written later in
an FBU’s life are more likely to be deleted, regardless of
whether they are actually worse.
Does excessive censorship cause users to write worse?
Finally, we wanted to understand if a draconian post dele-
tion policy could exacerbate undesirable behavior. In other
words, if users had their posts arbitrarily deleted, despite
writing similarly to other users whose posts were left alone,
were they more likely to write worse in the future?
In this study, we considered users who wrote at least 10
posts, and computed the mean text quality of each user’s
first five posts. We divided these users into two populations:
those which had four or more posts deleted among their
first five posts, and those who had one or less posts deleted.
Next, we matched pairs of users from these two populations
on text quality, and then compare the mean text quality of
their subsequent five posts. Here, a Wilcoxon Signed-rank
test shows a significant effect of the deletion rate (W>5956,
p<0.05, r>0.15). Thus, given two users who initially write
posts of similar quality, but where one user’s posts are then
“unfairly” deleted while the other user’s posts are not, the
former is more likely to write worse in the future.
Types of Antisocial Users
Motivated by our observations of antisocial behavior over
time, we can start to identify types of users based on their
behavior in different stages of their life in a community.
Users with Differing Deletion Rates
As Figure 4a indicates, the distribution of FBUs based on
the proportion of their posts deleted is bimodal. This sug-
gests that there are roughly two populations of users: FBUs
who have a high proportion of posts deleted (Hi-FBUs), and
FBUs who have a much lower proportion of posts deleted
Figure 5: (a) To compute the two-phase trend for a user, two
lines are fit to the deletion rates over time, one for the first
half of a user’s life, and one for the second half. (b) The
slopes of these two lines can then be subsequently plotted
and compared to that of other users to see how users “im-
prove” or “worsen” over time.
(Lo-FBUs). Here, we define Hi-FBUs as FBUs with a pro-
portion of deleted posts above 0.5, and Lo-FBUs as those
with a proportion below 0.5. Across all communities, the
number of users in each population is split fairly equally be-
tween the two groups.
Hi-FBUs exhibit characteristics more strongly associated
with antisocial behavior: compared to Lo-FBUs, they tend
to use language that is less accommodating (t>2.3, p<0.05,
d>0.17), receive more replies (t>1.8, p<0.05, d>0.10), and
write more posts per thread (t>3.9, p<10-4, d>0.21). On
CNN and Breitbart, Hi-FBUs also swear more (t>2.6,
p<0.01, d>0.16). Unsurprisingly, Hi-FBUs write fewer posts
than Lo-FBUs (on average, half as many) (t>2.4, p<0.01,
d>0.18) over a shorter period of time before getting banned.
Observing users’ post deletion rates over time, for Hi-
FBUs, their post deletion rate starts high and remains high
(Figure 4b). In contrast, Lo-FBUs tend to have a constant
lower post deletion rate, similar to users who were never
banned (NBUs), until the second half of their life where it
starts to rise significantly.
While both types of users are writing worse over time,
we hypothesize that this increased deletion rate among Lo-
FBUs could stem from a number of factors. First, Lo-FBUs
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Figure 6: (a) By plotting the slopes in the first (m1) and second (m2) halves of a user’s life, we can identify quadrants cor-
responding to how the deletion rate of a user’s posts changes over time. (b) We find that the deletion rate is more likely to
continuously increase for FBUs, and decrease for NBUs. (c) A substantial number of users with initially high deletion rates
appear to improve over time.
tend to write less similarly to other users near the end of
their lives: the text similarity of these users’ posts with other
posts in the same thread is significantly lower across their
last five posts than their first five (t>4.6, p<10-4, d>0.25)
(Figure 4c). Additionally, Lo-FBUs, while initially posting
across more threads in the early stages of their life, start to
both post more frequently (t>2.4, p<0.01, d>0.04), and in
fewer threads (t>5.6, p<10-4, d>0.23) later in their life. Thus,
a combination of a large number of less relevant posts in
a short period of time potentially makes them more visible
to other members of the community, including community
moderators, even if they are writing similarly as before.
Antisocial Behavior in Two Phases
Beyond differentiating between Hi-FBUs and Lo-FBUs, our
results thus far suggest that we may be able to more gen-
erally categorize users based on changes in their behavior
over time. Previously, we showed that changes in both text
quality and community perception can result in changes in
a user’s post deletion rate. We now attempt to characterize
this change over a user’s lifetime.
We consider a simple model which splits a user’s life into
two halves, with the goal of understanding how users may
change across them. We first fit two linear regression lines to
a user’s post deletion rate over time, one for each half of the
user’s life (Figure 5a). These post deletion rates are obtained
by bucketing posts into tenths of a users’ life, and computing
the proportion of posts deleted in each bucket. We can then
use the the slope in the first half, m1, the slope in the second
half, m2, and the intercepts c1 and c2 to quantify how the
deletion rate changes over time. If the slope is positive, the
deletion rate is increasing, and thus a user is getting “worse”
(with respect to activity and bias); if the slope is negative,
the deletion rate is decreasing, and a user is getting “better”.
We can further represent each user as a point (m1,m2) to
understand user behavior in aggregate (Figure 5b). Figure 6a
shows a scatter plot of the distribution of m1 and m2. The
cloud of red points (FBUs) is shifted upwards relative to that
of NBUs, indicating that overall, FBUs have more of their
posts deleted over time. By plotting m2 against m1, we can
also observe the relative change in deletion rates over time.
For instance, in Quadrant 1 (Q1 in Figure 6a), both m1 and
m2 are positive, indicating that the deletion rate for users
in that quadrant is increasing in both halves of their life. In
contrast, for users in Q2, the deletion rate decreases, then
increases (m1<0, m2>0). We find that the fraction of users
who are getting worse (Q1) is higher for FBUs than NBUs
(p<0.01) (Figure 6b). Further, the fraction of users who are
improving (Q3) is higher for NBUs than FBUs (p<0.01).
Similar to our previous analysis of Hi- and Lo-FBUs, the
change in deletion rates can be partially explained by the
changes in the text similarity of a post and previous posts
in the same thread: in all quadrants, when the text similarity
increases, the deletion rate decreases, and vice versa.
Characterizing users who were not banned. Throughout
this paper, we use ground truth data (i.e., whether a user
has been banned) to characterize antisocial users. However,
moderators may not catch all users engaging in antisocial be-
havior. For instance, some NBUs may have been initially de-
viant, but improved over time. Here, we identify users who
have an initially high proportion of deleted posts (≥ 0.5),
and compare the populations of users who were eventually
banned (FBUs) and those who were not (NBUs).
As shown in Figure 6c, overall, a smaller proportion of
NBUs get consistently worse (Q1)1, and a larger proportion
of NBUs do improve (Q3) (p<0.01). We also find a substan-
tial number of FBUs in Q3, implying that although these
users are improving in a sense, they still get banned. On the
other hand, the high proportion of NBUs in Q2 suggests that
many users who should be banned are in fact not. Nonethe-
less, this approach does not identify all users that exhibit
such behavior (e.g., those who have middling post deletion
rates but later become model community members).
Identifying Antisocial Users
In the communities we studied, users who are subsequently
banned from a community (FBUs) tend to live for a long
time before actually getting banned, suggesting that these
1The relatively low proportion of users in Q1 overall stems from
the fact since the deletion rate is initially high, few users actually
get even worse over time.
Feature Set Features
Post (20) number of words, readability metrics (e.g.,
ARI), LIWC features (e.g., affective)
Activity (6) posts per day, posts per thread, largest number
of posts in one thread, fraction of posts that are
replies, votes given to other users per post writ-
ten, proportion of up-votes given to other users
Community (4) votes received per post, fraction of up-votes re-
ceieved, fraction of posts reported, number of
replies per post
Moderator (5) fraction of posts deleted, slope and intercept of
linear regression lines (i.e., m1,m2,c1,c2)
Table 3: We considered four categories of features, which in
order correspond to having increasingly more information
about a user’s behavior in a community.
communities tend to respond slowly to toxic users. On CNN,
FBUs write an average of 264 posts (over 42 days), with 124
posts deleted before they are finally banned. Thus, we turn
our attention to building tools that could allow for automatic,
early identification of users who are likely to be banned in
the future. With only a user’s first ten posts, we find that
we can accurately differentiate FBUs from NBUs. By find-
ing these users more quickly, community moderators may
be able to more effectively police these communities.
Factors that help identify antisocial users
Using the observations and insights from previous sections,
we begin by designing features that can help identify antiso-
cial behavior in a community early on. We group them into
four categories (Table 3):
Post features. A natural predictor of a post’s undesirability
the content of the post itself. We previously found that posts
written by FBUs are less readable (and thus include readabil-
ity metrics), and differ in affective content such as swearing
(Wang and McKeown 2010). In our initial analysis, features
such as capitalization and punctuation (Adler et al. 2011;
Javanmardi, McDonald, and Lopes 2011) were not as in-
formative; sentiment classifiers did not provide significant
performance benefits above the affective categories from
LIWC.
Activity features. In addition to writing differently, FBUs
also differ from NBUs in their activity. For instance, FBUs
tended to spend more time in individual threads than NBUs.
Prior work also identified post frequency as a signal of a low
quality discussion (Diakopoulos and Naaman 2011). Thus,
we include features such as the proportion of posts that are
replies and the maximum number of posts in a single thread,
in addition to other features such as posts per day or votes
given to other users.
Community features. We also considered the different
mechanisms in which other members of a community in-
teract with users and their posts. For instance, a low propor-
tion of up-votes received has been shown to be perceived
negatively by users (Cheng, Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil, and
Leskovec 2014). As we only examine the first ten posts of a
CNN IGN Breitbart
Bag-of-words 0.70 0.72 0.65
Prop. Deleted Posts 0.74 0.72 0.72
Post 0.62 0.67 0.58
+ Activity 0.73 (0.66) 0.74 (0.65) 0.66 (0.64)
+ Community 0.83 (0.75) 0.79 (0.72) 0.75 (0.69)
+ Moderator 0.84 (0.75) 0.83 (0.73) 0.78 (0.72)
Table 4: A classifier that uses post, activity, community, and
moderator features is able to accurately predict whether a
user will be subsequently banned, and performs substan-
tially better than a bag-of-words classifier or relying on a
moderator to manually identify posts that should be deleted.
Shown are the performance improvements from incremen-
tally adding these features, with AUC reported. Individual
feature set performance is in parentheses.
user, indicators of reputation, while useful in other settings
(Adler et al. 2011), are unlikely to be informative here.
Moderator features. Moderator features (i.e., features re-
lating to post deletion) constitute the strongest signals of
deletion, as community moderators are responsible for both
deleting posts and banning users. In addition to the propor-
tion of posts deleted so far, we include the slopes and in-
tercepts of the deletion rate over the first ten posts. We also
consider the proportion of deleted posts as a strong baseline
to improve upon. Though moderator features alone outper-
form any other feature set, we can still achieve substantially
greater performance when all feature sets are aggregated.
Predicting antisocial behavior
With these features in mind, we consider a prediction task
where we observe a user’s first ten posts, and predict whether
this user will eventually get banned. Here, we perform
the above task on a balanced dataset of FBUs and NBUs
(N=18758 for CNN, 1164 for IGN, 1138 for Breitbart). In
other words, exactly half of users are eventually banned, and
random guessing achieves a classification accuracy of 50%.
Using a random forest classifier, we performed 10-fold cross
validation and report the area under the ROC curve (AUC).
All features were standardized.
As shown in Table 4, we can accurately predict whether
a user will be subsequently banned with a mean AUC of
0.82 (mean accuracy=0.74, mean F1=0.71). A logistic re-
gression classifier gives empirically similar results. The clas-
sifier remains robust even in the absence of moderator fea-
tures (mean AUC=0.79), which may be more difficult to ob-
tain as they essentially require manual labeling of posts. If
we rely on moderators to identify deleted posts, and only
use the proportion of posts deleted so far as our predictor,
we obtain a mean AUC of 0.73. A baseline bag-of-words
model that used logistic regression trained on bigrams per-
forms reasonably well (mean AUC=0.69), but is less gener-
alizable across communities as we later show. Instead com-
paring FBUs with all other users, as opposed to similarly ac-
tive users that were never banned (NBUs), results in slightly
better performance (mean AUC=0.87).
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Figure 7: (a) Prediction performance increases as more posts
are observed. Additionally, users who live longer are more
difficult to identify early on. (b) Using a sliding window of
five posts, performance decreases with increasing temporal
distance from the time of deletion.
To understand the relative importance of these features,
we computed the classification performance of each in-
dividual feature using logistic regression. Unsurprisingly,
moderator features are the strongest predictors of being
subsequently banned (individual feature set AUC=0.75 for
CNN), with the most performant feature being the propor-
tion of posts deleted (0.73). Community features were next
strongest (0.75), with a lower proportion of up-votes re-
ceived (0.67) and a higher number of reported posts (0.66)
both indicators of antisocial behavior. The text similarity of
a post with previous posts in a thread, while correlated with
post deletion, does not improve classifier performance. Ac-
tivty features follow (0.66), with the number of posts per
day the most indicative (0.64) of being subsequently banned.
Post features were collectively the weakest predictors of
whether a user will ultimately get banned (0.62). Future
work could involve identifying better textual features (e.g.,
phrase structure), and take the context of the post (i.e., the
surrounding posts) into account.
How does prediction performance change with the num-
ber of posts observed? If the classifier only has access to
the first five posts, it can still predict whether a user will get
banned with an AUC of 0.80 (across all communities). More
generally, performance seems to peak near ten posts (Figure
7a). The same figure also shows how classifier performance
changes for users with different post counts: the more posts
a user eventually makes, the more difficult it is to predict
whether they will get eventually banned later on.
How does prediction performance change with “dis-
tance” from when a user gets banned? Instead of looking
at a user’s initial posts, we now consider sliding windows
five posts in width, starting from the last five posts of a user,
to understand if posts made further in the past are as effective
as predicting whether a user will get banned. As Figure 7b
shows, it becomes increasingly difficult to predict whether
a user will subsequently get banned the further in time the
examined posts are from when the user gets banned. This
suggests that changes in both user or community behavior
do occur leading up to a ban.
How does the classifier perform on different types of
users? We previously identified two types of FBUs: those
Trained on
CNN IGN Breitbart
Te
st
ed
on CNN 0.84 0.74 0.76
IGN 0.69 0.83 0.74
Breitbart 0.74 0.75 0.78
Table 5: Cross-domain classifier performance (AUC) is rela-
tively high, suggesting that these learned models generalize
to multiple communities.
with high deletion rates (Hi-FBUs), and those with low
deletion rates (Lo-FBUs). Overall, the classifier identifies
Hi-FBUs (mean recall=0.99) more reliably than Lo-FBUs
(mean recall=0.41). As Hi-FBUs exhibit high deletion rates
from the beginning of their life while Lo-FBUs do not, fea-
tures such as the proportion of deleted posts are highly in-
formative in the former case but not the latter. Further, Lo-
FBUs write more posts in total than Hi-FBUs, so overall we
are examining a smaller fraction of a Hi-FBU’s total life in
a community. Still, by assigning higher weights to instances
of Lo-FBUs during training, we can maintain a similar AUC,
while increasing recall of Lo-FBUs to 0.57 (but decreasing
that of Hi-Del users to 0.97). If we are only interested dif-
ferentiating Lo-FBUs from other users, a classifier trained
on the same features obtains a mean AUC of 0.79 across all
communities (recall of Lo-FBUs=0.83). In this case, we may
use other mechanisms to identify Hi-FBUs separately.
How generalizable are these classifiers? Using a model
that uses all four feature sets, we find that cross-domain
performance is high (mean AUC=0.74) relative to within-
domain performance (Table 5), suggesting not only the ap-
plicability of these features, but also the generalizability of
models learned on single communities. Most striking is that
a classifier trained on the Breitbart community only per-
forms slightly worse if tested on CNN (0.76) or IGN (0.74)
than on Breitbart itself (0.78). We further note that bag-of-
words classifiers do not generalize as well to other commu-
nities (mean AUC=0.58).
Discussion & Conclusion
This paper presents a data-driven study of antisocial behav-
ior in online discussion communities by analyzing users that
are eventually banned from a community. This leads to a
characterization of antisocial users and to an investigation of
the evolution of their behavior and of community response:
users that will eventually be banned not only write worse
posts over time, but the community becomes less tolerant of
them. Next, it proposes a typology of antisocial users based
on post deletion rates. Finally, introduces a system for iden-
tifying undesired users early on in their community life.
By using explicit signals of undesirability (i.e., perma-
nent banning), we are able to study users engaged in a
wide variety of antisocial behavior. While scalable, our ap-
porach has several limitations. A more fine-grained label-
ing of users (perhaps through crowdsourcing), may reveal a
greater range of behavior. Similarly, covert instances of an-
tisocial behavior (e.g., through deception) might be signif-
icantly different than overt inflamatory behavior (Hardaker
2013); some users might surreptitiously instigate arguments,
while maintaining a normal appearance.
Further, a better analysis of the content of posts, and of the
relation between the posts in a thread, has the potential to re-
veal patterns associated with discussions stired by antisocial
users, e.g., if trolls purposefully ask overly naive questions
or state contrary viewpoints (Hardaker 2010).
Another future direction is developing a richer taxonomy
of antisocial behavior. Deeper analyses of the differences
among groups of users may reveal subtleties in how antiso-
cial users behave (e.g., if different users favor different types
of arguments). To better characterize the different stages of
a user’s life, future work could explore different models be-
yond piecewise linear models (e.g., locally weighted mod-
els). We also restricted our analysis to users who were per-
manently banned; studying users who were only temporarily
banned may shed more light how some users may redeem
themselves in a community. Additionally, antisocial behav-
ior may also differ in communities other than the ones we
studied (e.g., small special-interest communities).
Understanding how antisocial users may steer individual
discussions can help us better quantify their influence on
other users. Our initial explorations suggest that FBUs cause
discussions to veer off-topic: replies to FBUs were signifi-
cantly less similar to preceding posts in a thread than replies
to NBUs. One could also investigate the effects of having
multiple antisocial users participate in a discussion.
While we present effective mechanisms for identifying
and potentially weeding antisocial users out of a commu-
nity, taking extreme action against small infractions can ex-
acerbate antisocial behavior (e.g., unfairness can cause users
to write worse). Though average classifier precision is rela-
tively high (0.80), one in five users identified as antisocial
are nonetheless misclassified. Whereas trading off overall
performance for higher precision and have a human moder-
ator approve any bans is one way to avoid incorrectly block-
ing innocent users, a better response may instead involve
giving antisocial users a chance to redeem themselves.
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